Marketing externalities and market development by Emran, M. Shahe & Shilpi. Forhad
tooS A  39
POLRCY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2839
/ii<  rketing Externalities
d  :-  .i4arket  Development





















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2839
Abstract
Emran and Shilpi use survey data from Bangladesh  to  commodity externality  effects in the sale of farm
present empirical  evidence on  externalities at household  households. The vegetable markets  in villages with low
level sales decisions  resulting  from increasing  returns to  marketable surplus  seem to be trapped  in segmented
marketing. The increasing returns that arise  from thick  local market  equilibrium.  The analysis points to the
market effects and fixed costs imply that a trader is able  coordination  failure in farm sale decisions  as a plausible
to offer higher prices to producers  if the marketed  explanation  for the lack of development  of rural markets
surplus is higher  in villages.  The semi-parametric  even  after market  liberalization  policies are  implemented.
estimates identify highly nonlinear own and cross
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Introduction
The importance  of increasing returns,  externalities,  and multiple  equilibria in explaining  the
persistence  of underdevelopment  has  been  a perennial  theme  in the  development  literature.  1
That there can be multiple  Pareto-ranked  equilibria due to increasing  returns  and its associated
pecuniary externalities,  and that an economy  (or a region)  can be trapped in a low-level  equilib-
rium has gained wide acceptance  in recent theoretical literature, ranging from endogenous  growth
theory to new economic  geography.  Different sources of increasing returns and externalities have
been identified and analyzed (for example, fixed costs of production in urban manufacturing sector
as in Krugman  (1991)  and in subsequent literature on new  economic geography,  and  endogenous
technology  adoption  in final  goods sector  in  Ciccone and  Matsuyama(1996)).  2  However,  the
extant literature has not paid adequate attention to the role of marketing which is an important
source  of increasing  returns  and externalities  in a market  economy,  especially  at an  early stage
of development.  The  increasing returns  to marketing  arise  from thick market  effects  and  from
the  existence  of fixed  costs,  for  example,  in  hiring  a truck  and  in renting  in  a storage  space.3
Understanding  the implications  of increasing returns and externalities associated with marketing
for development  of markets  is of paramount  importance,  as  well-functioning  markets are widely
viewed as  the sine qua non of economic  development.  The objective of this paper is  to address
this important  but  largely  neglected  issue;  particularly  to provide  formal empirical  evidence  on
the existence  and  magnitudes  of the externalities  in  farm level  sales  decisions that  result  from
increasing  returns to marketing.
'The  literature  can  be traced back  at least to the presidential  address  of Allyn Young to the Royal  Economic
Society (1928).  The recent revival in interest owes much to the work of Murphy et.  al.  (1989).  See also, Matsuyama
(1992), Eswaran  and Kotwal  (1996),  Rodriguez-Clare  (1996), Hoff and Stiglitz (2000) and Ray (2000), among others.
Hoff (2000) provides  an excellent summary  of the theoretical literature  focusing on underdevelopment  traps.
2There is a small  (relative to the theoretical literature)  but rapidly expanding empirical literature on increasing
returns,  externalities  and  multiple  equilibria.  For instance,  in  Ciccone  and Matsuyama(1996),  private return  to
investment  increases  with the  aggregate  level of investment.  Productivity  of firms increases  with the size/density
of activities  e.g.  in Ciccone  and Hall(1996).
3In their in-depth study on the peasant marketing in Indonesia,  Hayami and Kawagoe (1993)  report that there
are large  economies  of scale  in  long-distance  trade.  It costs about  Rp.  1000-  Rp.  2000  to charter  a pony wagon
to Garut  bazaar,  carrying a load  up to 200  kg.  It costs  Rp.  5000  to charter  a mini truck for  any load,  up to the
maximum  capacity of 2 tons.  Therefore the cost  of transportation  is Rp.  5/kg or higher if a load of up to 200  kg
of soybean is carried  from the study village to Garut Bazaar by pony wagon, but the cost declines to Rp.  2.5/kg if
a two ton load is carried by a mini truck.  (P.54)The  increasing  returns  to  marketing  imply  that  a trader can  offer better  prices  to a farm
household located in a village with high aggregate surplus, as she can achieve significant economies
of scale  in marketing.  This results  in pecuniary externalities  at the households  level;  the sales of
an individual  household  of any given commodity  becomes a positive function  of the village level
aggregate marketed surplus of (i) the commodity itself (called  own externality), and (ii)  all other
commodities produced in the village (called cross externality).  The cross  externality effect  arises
from the fact that, when the marketable surplus  of any given commodity is small, a trader  needs
to pool multiple  commodities for reaping economies of scale.
The existence of fixed costs and externalities also implies that there can be multiple equilibria
which can be identified  with different  levels of market  development.  We identify  three distinct
stages of niarket  development  in  the rural areas  of developing  countries.  In the first  and most
underdeveloped  stage, the rural markets are isolated, and the market clearing occurs at the local
level.  The marketable  surplus is so low that it constrains the emergence  and operation of a long-
range  intermediary  class  that can  connect  the  local market  to the  central  or urban  market(s),
as it  is  not  possible to  reap  any  significant  economies  of  scale  in marketing.  At this  stage  of
market  development,  both the own  and  cross  externality  effects in the  sales decisions  discussed
earlier are absent or insignificant.  Moreover,  the price an individual  farm household gets for the
output is likely to be negatively correlated with the aggregate supply brought to the local market
due  to the standard  supply  shift  effect.  This,  in turn,  implies a  negative  own  externality like
effect,  as a farm household's  sales,  ceteris paribus, tend to be lower, when the neighbors bring in
more  to the market,  and  thus depress  the  (local)  market  price.  Observe  that the existence  of
fixed  costs implies  that  there  can be  a coordination  problem  in the sales  decisions  of the farm
households  and  a village  can be  trapped in  a segmented  local market  equilibrium.  Given  the
local  market  clearing,  it might  be individually  optimal  for  the farm households  not  to produce
more surplus, but when everyone produces  enough surplus, this might make long range marketing
intermediary profitable,  and thus integrate  the market  with the urban  centers.  4  In the second
stage of the market development,  the long  range marketing  intermediaries  are in operation,  but
4Observe that the coordination  failure can occur at two levels.  First, the sales decisions of all the farm households
need to be coordinated.  But that might  not be sufficient  to break  out of the  local equilibrium,  as the  increased
surplus  will only glut the  local  market  if it can not  be coordinated  with the  entry of the  prospective  marketing
intermediary.
2they need  to pool together  multiple  commodities  to cover  the fixed  costs  in transportation  and
storage  and to  reap  the economies  of scale.  So this intermediate  stage of market  development
is  characterized  by the presence  of both own  and cross  externality effects.  In the last and  most
developed stage of market development, the marketable surplus of each commodity is large enough
to permit commodity-wise  specialization  by the  marketing  intermediaries.  As  such there is no
cross  commodity  externalities  at this stage,  and it is characterized  by the existence  of only own
externality  effect.
Using household  level  data from  Bangladesh,  we  find  significant  evidence  of both own and
cross commodity externality effects.  While there are evidence of strong own externality effects in
rice  markets,  the cross  externality  effect  seems  to be absent.  The  evidence  thus imply that the
rice markets  in Bangladesh  have attained the  most developed  stage  of the three stages described
earlier.  For  a farm household  located  in a village  in the first quartile  (sorted by village surplus
of rice), the total sales  of rice increases  by 47 percent  when the average  sales of rice by all others
in the village doubles.  In contrast,  for  vegetables,  there  is a negative own externality  like  effect
in villages  with  low marketable  surplus,  indicating  the existence  of segmented  and local market
equilibrium.  The sales of vegetables by a farm household  in a village in the first quartile  ( sorted
by surplus  of vegetables)  tends to  decrease by  26  percent  when  the  average  sales  by  all others
doubles,  ceteris paribus.  5  The vegetables  markets in these  villages  seem to be  trapped in the
low-level isolated market  equilibrium.  The analysis  and evidence presented  here thus point  to a
plausible  explanation  of the apparently  puzzling  observation that, in many developing  countries,
the  deregulation  and  liberalization  policies  have  largely  failed  to accelerate  the development  of
the rural  markets  (Kherallah  et.  al.  (2000)).  To  the best  of our  knowledge,  ours  is the first
attempt  at  a formal econometric  analysis  of the  externalities  associated  with increasing  returns
to  marketing  in the rural markets of developing  countries.6
The rest  of the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  1 discusses  the different  sources of
increasing  returns  to marketing  and  the  many  economic  functions  performed  by  a marketing
intermediary  in developing countries.  Section  2 describes a simple model of a marketing interme-
5The elasticities  reported  here are based on 2SLS estimates.
61t is  interesting to compare our analysis to that  of Demsetz  (1968).  Using data from a well developed  market,
i.e.  the New York Stock  Exchange,  Demsetz  finds evidence  of significant  scale  economies in securities trade.  The
scale economies  arise from thick market externalities  from better matching of buyers and sellers when trade volume
of a given security increases.  Thus only a subset of what we call own externality  effects is considered.
3diary that guides the empirical analysis.  A  discussion of the econometric  issues  involved in the
estimation  of externality  effects  and of the specification  of the estimating equation  is provided in
the next  section.  Section  4 gives  a brief discussion of the data.  The main  empirical results  on
externalities,  using a semi-parametric  approach,  are presented in section  5.  Section 6  concludes
the paper  with  a summary  of the results  and a discussion  on the implications  of the results of
this paper for the broader theme  of agricultural  market development  and poverty  alleviation  in
developing  countries.
Section  1:  The Economics of Marketing  and  Market Development
Several  sources of increasing  returns to marketing  can be identified  from existing  theoretical
and empirical  literature.  First,  the cost of transacting  in a market can  decline with the scale of
trading due to thick market externalities  from better matching of buyers and sellers,  and from bet-
ter generation and transmission of information (e.g.  Demsetz (1968), Diamond (1982),  Rubinstein
and  Wolinsky  (1987)).  Second,  as  we mentioned  above,  two  of the most important components
of marketing:  transportation  and storage  give rise to natural increasing returns due to fixed costs
involved.  These are known as increasing returns to  bulking in the marketing literature.  Third,
setting up of a marketing network frequently involves substantial  sunk investments  in "intangible
assets"  like trust  and reputation.  The  available  empirical  evidence  from  developing  countries
indicate that markets in agricultural and many manufacturing  inputs and outputs operate on the
basis of relational contracts.  The relational contracts facilitate information sharing and informal
enforcement  of contracts  (Aoki and  Hayami(1999)).  The  intermediaries  traders need  to incur
significant  costs in  developing  these  informal  relationships,  which  can  be  termed  as a trader's
"social capital".  An important implication of the existence of increasing returns to marketing is
that, under  plausible conditions, it generates  pecuniary externalities at the level of individual  farm
households.  As the aggregate  volume  of trade increases  allowing a trader to take  advantage  of
the many different sources of increasing returns,  part of the gain is passed on to the producers in
the form  of higher prices,  especially when the entry into marketing is not restricted.7 Also, there
71n  1960s,  there  were  extensive  government  interventions  in the  agricultural  markets  of developing  countries
that often restricted entry by private traders.  The markets have, however,  been deregulated and liberalized starting
from  late  1970s.  Although stories of monopsonistic  behavior  in agricultural  markets abound in  popular accounts,
the prevailing  consensus from more careful studies is that the markets,  especially  at the local level,  are reasonably
4are significant cross commodity externalities,  especially at the early stages of development,  as the
marketed surplus  of a single commodity may not be large enough to recover the fixed costs, thus
providing incentives  for  pooling of different  commodities.8 The lack  of specialization  in  mar-
keting, both horizontally  and  vertically,  at early stages of development  is well-documented  (see,
for  example,  Hirsch  (1961),  Hayami  and  Kawagoe  (1993)).  The wide  prevalence  of producers
and traders associations in developing countries probably reflects,  at least in part, the outcome of
attempts to capture increasing  returns to marketing  at low levels of production and marketable
surplus.  9
While the existence  of increasing  returns to marketing can generate  positive externalities,  an
increase in the volume of trade, particularly  of different commodities, can also increase transaction
costs,  and thus eventually  limit the  number  of commodities  traded in a given market  (Demsetz
(op  cit)).  Market  intermediaries  play  a  critical  role  in  inspecting  and  verifying  quality  of a
commodity thereby facilitating  its exchange  even without personal examination by the buyers.10
This is  especially  important in developing  countries  because  of a lack  of standardization.  The
marketing intermediary  can be looked upon  as an expert in judging the quality of a product who
helps resolve  the  adverse  selection  problem  d la Akerlof's  lemon,  and  thus  can  stop a  market
from  unravelling  completely  (see,  for  example,  Biglaiser  (1993)).  However,  at early  stages  of
development,  any given intermediary  usually  handles a number of commodities,  and she can not
be expected  to be equally expert  in verifying  quality of all of them.  The diseconomies of scope
in performing  quality verification  is higher, the larger  the number and volume of commodities  in
competitive  or at least  "contestable"  (see,  for example,  Chowdhury  (1992)  on  Bangladesh, Kherallah  et al (2000)
on  Sub-Saharan  Africa).  That these markets are essentially  contestable was forcefully  argued early  on by  Bauer
and Yamey (1954).
8For instance, in smaller markets, once a truck is hired, traders are often seen to pool different commodities so as
to operate the truck near its capacity (to the extent possible).  If a single trader's volume is not large enough,  then
multiple  traders,  possibly  dealing with different  commodities,  may hire  a truck in  partnership  (see,  for example,
Belshaw  (1965)  for evidence on Fiji, and Hayami and Kawagoe  (op cit) for  Indonesia.)
9There are evidence that the same produce  gets better price when marketed through a marketing association in
comparison to individual  marketing.  For example,  while per box of squash marketed through the Ha-ee vegetable
marketing  group in Korea  got $6.58,  the price fetched  by  individual  marketers  was $5.92 in  1982  (P.118,  Abbot,
1987).  This  gave  an average  $800 additional  income to  a member  of the  group.  Although  part  of the price
differential  might  reflect  better bargaining  power  of the group,  economies  of scale  in marketing  (transportation,
storage and packaging)  arising  from fixed costs is  also an important factor.
10Even  for relatively homogenous commodities  like foodgrains, there are multiple  dimensions of quality that can
be important:  color,  taste,  appearance  of kernels,  moisture  content,  impurity,  breakage  of kernels,  and  baking
qualities (Gabre-Madhin,  1999).
5the portfolio  of a trader.11 With the increase  in income  and production,  as  marketed  surplus
increases  beyond  a threshold, a trader  can  reap the economies  of scale without pooling  different
commodities  together  which  leads  to specialization  in  marketing and creates  experts in quality
verification.  The above  discussion  forms the  basis for  the three stages  of market  development
discussed earlier.
We utilize household  level survey data from Bangladesh  to test for the existence of the exter-
nality effects  and to estimate them when they are present.  The  choice of Bangladesh as a case
study is motivated  by two characteristics  of its agriculture.  The average farm size is very small
and economic  activity is very  densely distributed  over geographic space,  an ideal combination for
generating pecuniary  externalities at the individual farm level.12 If the farm size is large enough
as  is the case  in much  of Latin America,  it is easy  for individual farmers  to reap the benefits  of
increasing returns to marketing,  and one should not observe any externality effects  across different
producers.  On the  other hand,  if the farms are  small but geographically  isolated,  it  would be
extremely  difficult,  if not  impossible,  to  reap  any  economies  of scale  in marketing.  The  high
geographic density and small farm size coupled  with the fact that most of the households produce
multiple commodities  due  to risk diversification  reasons,  imply that  the forces of both own and
cross externalities  are likely to be important in Bangladesh  agriculture.
Section 2:  Price formation  in the presence  of increasing  returns to mar-
keting
At the heart of our  analysis of externalities  in  farm level  sales is the formation  of producer
price of a commodity at a given market  (or at the farm gate) in the presence  of increasing returns
to marketing.  In  this  section,  we  develop  a simple  model  of price  formation  by considering
the optimization  problem  of an intermediary/trader.  Let  qi denote the amount  of commodity  i
shipped  from the local market,  and Q be the total volume of all commodities shipped from that
"1As pointed  out before,  even if traders are specialized commodity  wise, but deal with relatively small volume, a
number of traders can pool together and hire a truck to transport to the nearest urban market.  In this case, there
are no diseconomies  from spreading thin the quality inspection  skill, but there  are costs associated with coalition
formation  and collective  action.  Time and efforts  need to be spent to establish  such an  arrangement  and to hold
it together. Private marketing  cooperatives,  producers'  associations  fit into this category.  The model developed in
the next section  of the paper can be easily adapted to represent  such  an association where the quality verification
costs are  replaced by the costs of coalition formation  and collective  action.
1 2With population  density of more than  2000 per  square  mile,  Bangladesh  is  considered  as the  most  densely
populated non-city country in the world.  The average farm size is about  1 hectare.
6market.  We  assume that there exists a variable cost  per unit of the commodity  i shipped to the
destination market u, denoted as di(tu, w),  where  tu is the distance between local market and the
destination market u, and w denotes the wage rate. 13  It is assumed that d  (.) is a positive function
of both distance  and  wage  rate.  The wage  rate reflects the costs of hiring labor for  packaging,
and  loading  and  unloading  of  commodities.  The  demand  for  commodity i  in the  destination
market  is described by the inverse demand curve  Pi  = aiq,-'  where 0 < cri < 1.  We assume,  for
simplicity,  that supply in  the local  market  can  be described  by an  upward sloping  supply curve
Pi  =  77iqi6'  where  6i  >  0.  14  Both the  demand  and  supply  curves  satisfy the conditions  for an
interior  solution.  In order to capture  the positive externality  generated  by an increased  volume
of trade,  we assume that,  for  a long-distance  trader operating  from the local market,  there  is  a
set up  cost r(qi, Q-i) = F + C(qi, Q-i), where  Q-i = EkOi  qk.  Observe  that  the set up  cost
equation r(qi, Q-i)  is  an  affine  function  implying that there  is  a pure  fixed  cost  component  F
which includes  costs  incurred  in  building  a trader's  "social capital"  along with any  fixed  costs
in transportation  and  storage.  The other  part  of the  set up cost  function C(qi, Q-i)  captures
the increasing returns due to factors like thick market effects,  and possibly quantity discounts in
transportation  and storage.  The  marginal quality verification  cost for commodity i, denoted as
Mi(Q-i), is assumed to depend  positively on the volume of all other goods that are being traded
by the intermediary.  This is the diseconomies  from spreading the quality verification skill over a
portfolio of multiple commodities.  The optimization problem for a typical trader operating from
the local market can be described  as:
n
Max{q,....q}fII  =  E[Pi-  Pi-  rid,(t,  W) -Mi(Q-i)]qi-  r(qi, Q-i)  (1)
i=1
There  are  two  important  features  of the profit  equation  as  defined  above.  First,  instead
of defining  the  profit  equation separately  for  each  commodity,  we  allow the trader  to combine
different  commodities  in her portfolio and to optimize  the joint profit.  Second, the function r(..)
" 3Here u stands  for urban.
14Although  the specifications  of demand and  supply functions are simple, they allow for regional variations.  The
demand for a commodity may depend on the region it is produced.  This can be due to the fact that different aspects
of the quality  of a commodity depend,  among other  things, on the agro-climatic  characteristics of the geographical
region it is produced.  For example,  mango produced  in Rajshahi usually command a premium in Bangladesh.  The
supply of a commodity  also is dependent  on agro-climatic  characteristics of a producing region.
7captures  the  own and  cross  externalities  that arise  from  different  sources  of increasing  returns
discussed  earlier.  From equation  (1),  the first-order  conditions  for optimization  can be derived
as:
(1 - o'1 )P-  (1 + 6i)Pi-  ridi(t.,  w) - Mi(Q_i)  - C(qi, Q_i) =  0  (2)
for all i =  1, 2, .... n, and where C' =  c  15  The marginal benefits from an increase in qi consist
of the marginal  revenue  in the destination  market  and the marginal  benefit  (-Ci())  generated
by an increase in trade volume.  The marginal costs on the other hand comprise of the marginal
procurement,  transportation  and  quality  verification  costs.  The  optimal qi  is  chosen  so  as to
balance the marginal  benefits and costs.16
In order to detect the strength of the own and cross externality effects in the empirical analysis,
we solve equation  (2)  to derive an equation for the producer  price at the local market:
Pi=  piPi  - vid,d+  Aigi(qi, Q_i)  (3)
where  pi  =  ____  vi  =  Ai=  and  gi(qi,Q-i)  = -Mi(Qi) - C(qi, Q_i).  So  the
function  gi(qi,  Q_i) represents  the  effects of own  and  cross  externalities  on the  producer  price
received  by the farmers  in the local market,  assuming that the intermediary can cover  the fixed
cost F.  From simple  partial differentiation,  we have:




As defined  before,  Cij =@  2  and C" =  . We  assume that Mi  > 0  and Mi'I > 0.  Note
that if C'j > 0, then  < 0.  The intermediary  can do better by specializing  either in qi or qj  as
the overall  cross externality  effect  is negative.  Similarly,  if Cii > O, then the intermediary  faces
"We  use superscripts to a function for denoting partial derivatives.
16A  zero  profit  condition  characterizes  the  equilibrium  due  to free  entry  or  contestability.  The  zero  profit
condition determines the equilibrium  wage rate w'.
8diseconomies  of scale as  < 0.  We  focus on the more plausible case  where both  C"j < 0 and
Cii < 0 . In order to rule out the possibility of a complete specialization  irrespective  of the level
of market  development, we  further assume  that gi(qi, Q_i)  > 0 at Q-i = 0, qi  O 0.  Note that  in
the case  where the positive  cross externality  (-C'ij > 0) out weighs the rising quality  verification
costs  (Mij > 0),  the net externality  effect  is  positive,  i.e.,  t  >  0.  In  order  to allow  for  the
-possibility that  the positive  cross externality  may wear  out with an increase  in trade  volume  at
higher  level of market  development,  we  assume that Ciii >  0.17  Under  these assumptions,  we
can show with simple  differentiation that gi() is  a concave function  of Q_j.  The decoupling  of
trading  of  qi  from  all  other  commodities  (Q-j)  occurs  if net  externality  generated  by  pooling
trade of these commodities  is non-positive  at qj = 0,  Vj  :A i, i.e.,  if -(Cii  + Mi)  < 0.  If we define
marginal  benefit  from  an  increase in trade  volume  as (-Ci),  the assumptions  that C'j < 0 and
Ciii > 0 for all j 0 iim ply that  the marginal benefit  is increasing at a decreasing rate with an
increase in  the volume of trade of all other commodities.  We summarize  the above discussion  in
the  following  propositions.
Proposition  1:  Given  that (i)  the  marginal benefit from an increase in volume  of trade
(-Ci) is increasing (-Cij>  0)  but at a decreasing rate (-Ciij  <  0)  for all j  ¢  i,  (ii) the
cost of quality verification is a rising (Mij  >  0)  and convex  (Mij  > 0) function of volume  of
all other commodities j  0  i, and (iii) the net externality function gi(qi,  Q_)  > 0 at Q-i =  0,
then gi(qi, Q_j) is a concave function of Q_j.  Moreover,  for any qi > qi , where di is such that
(Cii(qi, O)  + Mij(0)  0  O,  'i  # i),  there is complete specialization in qi.
Compared  with the cross externality  effects,  the relationship  between  own  externality  effect
and market development  is  different  because  such effects  are likely to be present  even in highly
developed  markets  (as in  Demsetz  (op  cit)).  Also,  even with  own  externality  effects,  one can
expect  diseconomies  to set  in eventually  with  an expansion  in trade  volume,  as a trader  needs
to delegate  decision making and monitoring  responsibility with the attendant  incentive problems.
We present  these insights in the form of a proposition below.
17We  identify the level  of market development with the volume  of trade.
9Proposition  2:  Given that the marginal benefit from an increase in volume  of trade (-Ci)
is increasing (-C" > 0)  but at a  decreasing rate (-C... <  0) for all i,  and the net externality
function gi(qi, Q_i) > 0 at qi  O 0,  then gi(qi, Q_i) is a concave function of qi.
Observe that both own and cross externality effects are subject to important threshold effects,
especially  at  the  low  levels  of marketable  surplus,  due  to the pure  fixed  costs  (F) involved  in
marketing.  Also, it follows from the concavity of gi() that the cross externality effects are stronger
at relatively low level of market  development  when the volume of trade is small.
Section  3:  Econometric  Specification
(3.1)  An Econometric  Model of Household's Sales  Decision
In the preceding  section,  we developed  the relationships  between  producer's  price  of a com-
modity and the volume of (i) trade of that commodity itself and (ii) trade of all other commodities.
In this section,  we embed  these relationships  in a standard  econometric model of the sales deci-
sion of a farm household.  18  The relevant  optimization of a farm household  involves a two stage
recursive  process.  In the first stage,  land allocation  and planting  decisions are  made based  on
the  expected prices  which  are  primarily  determined  by the  last period's  actual  prices.  In  the
second  stage,  sales decisions  are made taking  output  as predetermined,  and the volume  of sales
depends on the current producer prices offered  by the trader  and on other household and village
characteristics.  The sales  decision of a household (h)  for a given commodity  i can be described
by the following equation:
Yih  = I3iiXh + ,8i 2Xr + 7riPi+  Eih  (4)
Where i =  1, 2, ... ,  Yih  is the sales of commodity  i by household  h,  3i and iri are parameters,
1 8From the discussion  on the price formation in the preceding section, it seems natural to estimate  a (producer)
price equation  (equation (3)) to detect the externality effects.  However, in our data set, it was not possible to match
the consumer and produce prices  due to differences  in units and quality,  which renders this approach  non-feasible.
The second option  is to estimate an equation for the land price which reflects the expected producer prices because
of capitalization.  But this approach  is  fraught with two  important difficulties.  First, the land price commands  a
premium due to its collateral value in the credit market  which dilutes the link between the producer prices  and the
land price.  Second,  the land price  may not reflect  the producer  price faithfully enough  when the land  market is
thin or virtually nonexistent.  These problems seem to be important in case of Bangladesh.  We focus on the sales
at individual  household  level which avoids the problems associated  with a land price equation discussed  above.
10Xh is a vector of control variables representing household and farm characteristics,  X, is the vector
of village/region  level characteristics,  and Pi denotes  the producer  price in the local market that
the household  has accesses  to, and  eih  is the  error term.  Utilizing  equation  (3)  to substitute  for
Pi, we have:
Yih  =  f3 1lXh +  I 2Xr + qJPi+  Oidl(tu  W)  +  Oigi(qi, Q-i) +  eih  (5)
Where 7i  =-  7riAi,  j  =irivi and Xi _  7riAi.  To allow  for the differences  in the own and  cross
externality effects  at different  levels of market development,  and for tractability in estimation,  we
decompose  gi(  into two separable  parts as:
gi(qi, Q-j) = si(qi) + ei(Q-j)  (6)
Where  si(qi) represents  the own externality  effects,  and ei(Q-j) the cross  externality  effects.
Since  there  is  no  theoretical  guidance  in  our  framework  about  the  functional  specification  of
d,(tU, w), we adopt a linear function,  which gives us the  following form for the sales equation:
Yih =/lXh + /i 2Xr +  7i 7 Pi + iltu +  i2w +  Oi(Si(qi)  + ei(Qi)) +  eih  (7)
(3.2)  Econometric  Issues and Estimating  Equation
If individual  households  are small  producers,  and hence  are price takers  in the market,  then
village  level total sales  of commodity  i and of all other commodities  can be used  as explanatory
variables  in the  household  level sales regressions  for  commodity i to identify the own  and  cross
externality  effects respectively.'9 However,  several econometric  issues including  endogeneity and
omitted  variables  complicate  the identification  of these  effects.  For  example,  both  the  average
sales  by households  and the village  level sales are typically higher in villages  which are endowed
with  better  infrastructure. 20 Hence  omission  of  variables  like  infrastructure  which  may  affect
19This is similar to the argument made by Rauch  (1993)  that since a worker is a price taker in the labor market,
average  human capital in  a city can be used to identify the positive  human capital externality  in  individual  wage
regressions.
2 0The existing evidence on Bangladesh  show that both producer  price and marketed surplus are higher in villages
11both individual and  village  level sales positively  can potentially cause  serious upward bias in the
estimates of own  and cross externality effects.  In order to control for the level  of development,
we include  a number  of village  level  variables  such as  village population,  median household  ex-
penditure,  a number of dummies  denoting whether there are markets within the village,  whether
the village has electricity, telephone  connection, paved roads and formal banks.  We  also included
percentage  of operated  land  irrigated  in the  village  so as  to control  for any supply  shifts that
may affect both individual  and village  level sales  due to adoption of HYV technology.  This also
partially mitigates the effects of village  level weather shocks  (like rainfall).21  We include regional
dummies  to control  for regional  production shocks,  and use yield per acre  at household  level  as
a control  for unobserved  heterogeneity,  including factors  like household-specific  and village  level
production shocks,  and land quality differences  for which data are not available.  All regressions
also include a set of variables  depicting household  and farm characteristics  that may influence  a
household's  sales decisions.
The village level sales variables  (qi  and Q-i) could also be spuriously correlated  with sales by
the household  (qih)  if there are very  few  sellers  in a village.22 Thus, instead  of using  aggregate
village  level sales,  we  take out the  sales by the  household  itself from the village  level sales  and
normalize  by the number of producers.  The per capita23 sales  of a given commodity i and that
of all other commodities  are denoted as  qi  and QC-i respectively.  Using these  adjusted variables,
we  can  rewrite  the  own  and  cross  externality  functions  of equation  (6)  as  si(4i) and  ei(Q_i)
respectively.  An important problem  in estimation  of the externality effects  arise from the fact
that, even after  controlling for all the effects discussed  in the previous paragraph,  the per capita
sales variables  are likely  to suffer  from  endogeneity  due  to simultaneity between  own  sales  and
sales by others in the village.  To address this problem  we use instrumental variables and employ
a two-stage  approach to the estimation.  In addition to the other exogenous  and predetermined
with relatively developed infrastructure.  For example, Ahmed and Hossain (1990) report that paddy and rice prices
are 2 percent  and  6 percent  higher  respectively  in  villages with developed  infrastructure.  The  marketed surplus
depending on the landownership  groups are  as  follows.  For less than 0.5 acre  land ownership  group,  the marketed
surplus is 52 percent (developed  infrastructure)  and  is 14 percent  (underdeveloped  infrastructure).
21It is important to note here that the survey year  1995-96  was NOT subject to flood or drought  in Bangladesh.
22  Moreover,  there could be  villages  in the  sample which  do not  sell  (production  for subsistence  only) a given
commodity.  If such cases are not insignificant  in a data set, both qih and qi might be significantly  censored resulting
in near-perfect  fits.
23Throughout  this paper per capita  implies average  over the producers.
12variables,  the following axe  used in the first  stage regressions  as instruments  for the average sales
by others in the village  :  (i)  average  household  size and composition,  (ii) average  farm size  and
input uses,  and (iii) average per  acre yield,  where the  average is taken over all other households
in the village, i.e.,  when estimating  the sales equation  for household  h1, the average  is over  all
h #t  h1.24  Note that (i) the average farm size, and (ii) the average  household size and composition
of all others in the village  are  arguably exogenous  with respect  to the  sales  decision of a given
farm household  and thus can be considered  as identifying  instruments.  Also,  observe  that the
yield and input use  qualify as instruments because  production  can be treated  as predetermined,
given  the  two-stage  sequential  optimization  by  a farm household.  In addition,  the  household
composition variables of any given household (like share of adult,  average year  of male education)
can also be treated as exogenous  for the sales  decision of that very household in a given year.
Although si(4,) and ei(O-i) functions are likely to be concave in their arguments, the existence
of threshold  effects  makes  it  difficult  to  approximate  their  curvature  with  a simple  quadratic
specification of the functional  form.  Hence  we utilize a semi-parametric  approach to identify the
functional forms of both ei((_i) and si(4i).  Notice that a fully non-parametric  estimation in this
case is both computationally expensive and subject to the curse of dimensionality,  as there exist a
large number of regressors besides Q-i or qi.  The semi-parametric  method suggested by Robinson
(1988)  also involves running a large number of bivariate kernel  regressions.25 Instead  of using  a
fully  semi-parametric  approach,  we utilize  a much simpler  approach  based on dummy  variables
(see  Cosslett,  1991).  Taking discrete approximation,  the function  ei(Q(_)  can be rewritten as:
ei (O-i)=  Ojwj  (8)
j=1
where wj is a dummy,  Oj is the parameter to be estimated and I is the total number of dummies.
To approximate  ej(O_i),  the entire domain of observed  Q-i is  divided into intervals  and each wj
24The first  stage regressions  also include  a set  of dummies indicating  village  level infrastructure  and 7  regional
dummies.
25The semi-parametric approach d la Robinson(1988)  Will require kernel estimations  of E(YjQ-i) and E(Xj IQ-i)
for all j  explanatory variables  excluding  Q-i at the first stage.  In the second  stage two  more kernel regressions
are  needed  to determine  the parametric  and  non-parametric  parts  of the  model..  The estimation  of the  kernel
regressions  in  our  case  is  especially  complicated  because  most of the dependent  variables  are  censored  and the
explanatory  variables  include  a large number of dummies.  As the kernel  estimation technique  for  discrete choice
models, censored  and  ordinary  regression  models  are  different,  fully semi-parametric  estimation  of each  equation
would require combination  of different  kernel regression  techniques  also.
13takes the value  of unity if it belongs to a certain interval  and zero  otherwise.  We  define 20  such
dummies,  and include  19 of them  in the regression  as each regression  also  contains  an intercept
term.  Similarly,  we defined 20  dummies  (denoted  as Vj,  j  =  1, .., 20)  over the entire domain of di
and include  19 of them in the regression:
k
Si NO=  E  jVj  (9)
j=1
Now substituting equations  (8) and  (9) into equation (7),  we have the following  estimating equa-
tion:
k  I
Yih  =  3ilXh +  3i 2Xr +  m7Pii+  Oilt.  +  O  i2W  +  Xi E  (3vj  +  /i  E  03wj+  eih  (10)
j=2  j=2
which can be estimated  consistently  using appropriate estimation technique given that k and 1 are
fixed.  Note  that the  finer are the dummies  the better will  be the approximation  of ei(Q-i)  and
si(qi).  However,  such finer  approximation  is  achieved at the  cost  of roughness  of the estimated
parameters  0j  and  (j.  To  obtain  smoothed  estimates  6^ (Q_i) and  si(qi),  we  follow  the  two-
step  procedure  suggested  by  Jacoby  (2000).  In  the first  step,  an  appropriate  estimator  (see
the discussion  below)  is  used  to estimate the parameter  vector  in equation  (10).  We calculate
O  6jwj for each observation utilizing the estimated parameters.  In the second step, gi(Qti) is
estimated  by running a simple kernel regression  of Ej"=  9jwj  against Q-i  using  locally weighted
scatterplot smoother  (LOWESS).  We follow a similar procedure to obtain the smoothed estimate
of Si(di)-
There  are  alternative  econometric  approaches  one  can  follow  to estimate  the parameters  of
the sales equation  (10).  Since there is significant  censoring in the data due to non-participation
of the households  in the market,  and heteroscedasticity  is  an important  problem  in the cross-
section data,  Tobit is  likely  to over-estimate  the  (slope)  parameters,  while  OLS  (with standard
errors  corrected  for  clustering  effects)  is  likely  to  under-estimate  them  (  for  a lucid  discussion
of alternative  estimators,  see  Deaton,  1997).26  So  when both  of these estimation  methods  are
employed,  one  can  provide  with  bounds  for  the estimated  values  of the parameters.  Another
26It  is  important  to emphasize that we use  instruments  and employ a two-stage  procedure to correct  for endo-
geneity biases  in both Tobit  and OLS regressions.
14option is to use  Censored  Least Absolute  Deviation (CLAD)  (Powell,  1984) for estimation of the
parameters  which  is free  of distributional  assumptions  and is expected to give better estimates,
compared to both Tobit  and  OLS.  However,  as we discussed  above,  endogeneity  (simultaniety)
is likely to be a significant  problem  in estimating the  sales equations,  and  thus an  instrumental
variables  approach is necessary  to tackle the problem.  Unfortunately,  not much is known,  to our
knowledge,  about  the properties  of CLAD  when instrumental variables  are used,  which renders
CLAD  unsuitable  for our purpose.27 Since our basic objective  is to see if there is any evidence
of the externality  effects  in the data due to increasing returns  to marketing,  a bounds approach
seems a sensible route which we follow here.
Section 4:  Data and Descriptive  statistics
The data come from the 1995/96 Household  Expenditure Survey of Bangladesh,  a nation wide
representative  households  survey conducted  periodically  by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.
A two-stage stratified random  sample of 7420 households  were drawn from 371 primary sampling
units  (PSUs).  A  separate  community questionnaire  was  administered  in a subset of  252 rural
PSUs generating  much of the community  level data utilized in our study.
The household  questionnaire  collected  detailed  information  on a household's  food and  non-
food expenditure,  income,  education and other  household  characteristics.  The survey included
a module  where  information  on agricultural  production,  home  consumption  and sales  were col-
lected for  27 different  crops.  Of these 27 crops,  we focus  on only  three broad  groups:  rice  (both
high  yielding varieties  (HYV)  and  local varieties),  vegetables,  and  fruits.  The survey  provides
information  on input  uses  (expenditure  on fertilizer)  and size  of the  operational  holdings.  In
addition to the farm characteristics,  we include  household  characteristics  such as  household  size,
composition,  average years of education  for male and female  adults as explanatory variables.  As
the consumer  prices  at relevant  destination markets are not available  in the data set,  we control
for them with a set of regional  dummies.
[REFER  TO TABLE 1]
27We note that when CLAD is employed for estimation using the instrumental variables, the parameter estimates
are, in general, very close to the estimates obtained by 2SLS.  Moreover, the shapes of the own and  cross externality
curves from nonpararnetric  estimation  remain essentially the same as the ones reported here.  The results of CLAD
estimation are available  on request.
15Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  Nearly 81 percent  of 4980 rural households  are
engaged in crop production.28 The predominance of rice cultivation is evident as about 78 percent
of the farmers produce  some rice.  Market participation rate is fairly high with about  75 percent
of the farmers  selling some output  in  the market.  However,  there  exist wide  variations  in the
market  participation  rates among  farmers  producing  different  crops.  The  market participation
rates  are  higher  for rice  compared  with  vegetables  and  fruits.  Average  sales  by  a producer  is
highest  for rice,  about taka  5400,  and  is less than tk.1000  for vegetables  and fruits.
The village level summary statistics also point to the predominance  of rice both in production
and sales.  Although a smaller percentage  of production (29 percent) of rice is sold in the market,
its market appears  to be thicker than other crops.  Both mean and median  sales of rice exceed
that of any other crops.  These variations  in the market  thickness  of different  crops  along with
variations  in  the market  participation  of households  even  within  a single crop  category  provide
an excellent  opportunity to test the externality  effects  in trading of different  crops.
Section  5:  Empirical  Results
In this section,  we present the estimates  of the household's  sales equations  for rice,  vegetables
and fruits.  The dependent  variable  is the logarithm  of quantity  of  commodity  i sold by house-
hold  h.29 As  noted  before,  we  use instruments  to tackle  potential endogeneity  problems  in the
estimation of the  own and  cross externality  effects.  The first stage  regressions for  instrumental
variable estimates  show that the instruments have high explanatory power,  as the F tests for joint
significance  of the instruments  have a P-value  of 0.00  in all of the first stage regressions.30
[REFER  TO TABLE 21
The  results of the semiparametric  estimates  of the sales equations  are presented  in Table  2.
The estimates of the parametric part suggest  that, among the household and farm characteristics,
household  size,  farm  size  and  yield  per  acre  are  the  major  determinants  of household's  sales
decisions.  The wage rate has a consistently  negative  sign  across  the sales equations for all three
28About  5038  households are rural but IDs of three PSUs  in the household  data could not be matched with that
of PSUs reported in the community data forcing us to drop around 60 observations.
29Since  there is censoring,  and natural  log of zero is  undefined,  we define the dependent  variable  as In(quantity
sold+1).  In what follows, we use the phrase  'logarithm  of quantity of is to denote  ln(qi + 1).
3 0The results of first  stage regressions are omitted for the sake of brevity and are available  on request.
16crop  groups,  which  confirms  the hypothesis that  a higher  wage  increases  the  costs of a  trader.
Consistent with the  d priori expectations,  the Tobit estimates are,  in general,  numerically  larger
than those from TSLS.
The Wald tests of joint significance of the dummies capturing the own externality  effects show
strong evidence  of own externality  effects  across  all three crop  groups;  the null hypothesis  of no
own externality  can be rejected in all cases with a P-value of 0.00, except for the TSLS regression
for  rice where  the  null  is rejected  with  a P-value  of 0.04.  The  evidence  on cross externality  is
mixed.  According  to the Tobit estimates,  cross  externality effects are statistically  significant  for
all  three crops.  However,  the  TSLS  estimates  indicate  that  it  is  insignificant  for  rice  (P-value
0.35),  marginally significant  for fruits  (P-value 0.18) but significant  for  vegetables  (P-value 0.09)
(see  Table  2).
[REFER  TO FIGURES  1 AND  2]
To analyze  the pattern of non-linearity  in the externality  effects,  we plot the non-parametric
2SLS  estimates  of the own  externality  (si(Qt))  and  cross  externality  (ei(Q..-)  )  functions  along
with  their  confidence  intervals  in  Figure  1  and  Figure  2  respectively. 31 The  estimated  own
externality curve, si(di),  for rice show that it is monotonically  upward sloping.32 Although there
is no evidence of significant non-linearity,  the curve is mildly concave indicating  that the strength
of own externality  effect  weakens at  higher level of trade.  For fruits,  the own  externality  curve
is  quasi concave,  indicating  that there  is important  threshold  effects  in operation.  At very  low
level of sales  there  is little  or  no evidence  of any own  externality  effect,  but the  effect  picks  up
strongly  after sales passes  a threshold.  Vegetables  by far display the most non-linearity;  the own
externality  curve  is  convex  up  to a point  and  then  it  becomes  concave.  The  own  externality
effect  is negative  at lower  levels  of trade  and then increases  up to a point  before  tapering off to
some  extent at higher  levels of trade.  As discussed  before,  such negative  own externality  effects
for vegetables  is primarily  due  to the  effects  of supply  shifts on the  local market  price.  This
31The shapes  of the curves  remain essentially same when  Tobit estimates are used instead.
32Note that each of the regression  includes an intercept term and hence for normalization we dropped one dummy
(01  = 0 for dummies w 3 capturing  the spline  of ei(.)  and el  = 0 for  v; defining  the spline  of s.(.).  Therefore  the
estimated  functions  are  in  fact  v  and  v  respectively  where  j  =  2.. .k.  Even  if we  drop  the  intercept  term,
identifications  of both  a,  and  C, are  not possible.  What  matters  for  our  analysis  is the  shape  of  each  of the
functions.  For  a sense of numerical  magnitude of the externality  effects,  we present the elasticity  estimates in the
following sections.
17means that  the producer  price is  determined  by market clearing  at the local  level, which  in turn
implies  that there is  a meagre marketable  surplus for  the village as whole and the local markets
are not integrated with the urban markets.  So a statistically and numerically significant negative
own externality  indicates  that the  vegetables  markets  in villages  with  low levels  of marketable
surplus might be caught  in underdevelopment  trap, as the marketing intermediaries  are unable to
recover  the fixed  costs involved  (the storage and transport  costs  are much higher  for perishable
commodities  like vegetables).  The  weakening  of  own  externality  at  a high  level  of trade,  on
the other hand,  may  be due to  agency problems  in trading  as  the intermediary  has  to delegate
decision  making and decentralize  operations when the scale  of trade grows beyond  a point.
The cross externality  functions  plotted in Figure 2 show that, for rice, there are no significant
evidence  of any  cross externality  effects  as the curve  is  nearly a horizontal  line with few  minor
bumps.  The absence of any significant  cross externality  effect for rice,  however,  is not surprising.
The current consensus  among the observers of rural markets in Bangladesh is that the rice market
is by far the most developed one, and thus it is only natural that a feature of relatively undeveloped
markets like cross externality will be absent from a developed market.  The cross externality curve
is concave  shaped for fruits; there  seems to be significant  positive cross externality  effects at low
levels  of trade  which  yields  to the diseconomies  of scope  after  a threshold  is reached.  In case
of vegetables,  the cross  externality  curve  seems  to  be  flat  up  to  a  point  after  which  it has  a
negative  slope indicating the onset of diseconomies  of scope.  An apparently  plausible alternative
explanation  of the  negative  cross  externality  effect  for fruits  and vegetables  is that it is due to
crowding out in production that results from fixity of land.  For example, as more land is allocated
to other crops  (rice plus fruiits),  less is available for planting vegetables.  However,  observe that
such crowding out effects  are not likely to be important in our analysis,  as we exclude  a number
of crops and the adding up constraint  in land allocation  is not relevant for our case.
Estimates of Elasticities
While the graphs  of the nonparametric  functions of the own and cross externality  effects  are
excellent  tools  for  identifying  the shapes  of the relationships,  they  do  not provide  us with any
sense of the  numerical  magnitudes  of  these effects.  In this  section,  we  report the  estimates  of
elasticities of own and cross externality effects for different quartiles of households sorted according
18to the level of sales.  The elasticities of household sales with respect to the per capita sales of the
commodity  itself (own  externality)  and  of all other  commodities  (cross externality)  by all other
households  in the village are calculated  using the estimated  ei(Q-i) and si(qi)  functions.  For the
elasticity estimation,  we divide the entire domain of the explanatory variables,  log of Q-i and log
of di,  into five intervals each containing  approximately  20 percent  of the observations.  Next  we
estimated  a straight line spline through the mean of two consecutive  intervals.  The elasticity  is
then estimated  as the slope  of the  spline.  The estimated  elasticities are  presented in Table  3.
[REFER TO TABLE  3]
The pattern of the elasticity of own externality effect varies widely across different crop groups.
The magnitude  of the  elasticity  is the highest  in the first quartile  for rice,  and  then it declines
monotonically  (Tobit estimates)  or remains  constant  (TSLS estimates).  The elasticity  is  mono-
tonically increasing for both vegetables and fruits according  to the estimates from TSLS, while the
Tobit estimates indicate that there are non-linearities  in the relationships,  particularly for fruits.
If we focus on the relatively  conservative estimates of the TSLS regressions,  the evidence indicate
that a doubling of per capita sales of rice by all other households  in the village increases the total
sales  of rice  by  a given  household  by  47  percent  if it belongs  to  a village  in  the first  quartile,
and by 38 percent if the household  belongs to any of the other three quartiles.33 For vegetables,
the  elasticities  for the first two quartiles  are negative  in both TSLS  and Tobit estimates  (-0.26
(TSLS),  -0.49  (Tobit)  for the first quartile,  and -0.18 (TSLS)  and -0.35 (Tobit) for the second
quartile),  indicating  an initial  phase of diseconomies.  According  to TSLS  estimates,  this  initial
phase of diseconomies  is eventually  overcome  in the third quartile  (elasticities  are 0.10  for third
quartile  and  0.27 for  fourth  quartile).  According  to the Tobit  estimates,  this initial  phase  of
diseconomies  weakens  significantly  in third and fourth quartiles  but does not disappear  entirely
(elasticities are -0.04 (third quartile) and -0.01 (fourth quartile)).  For fruits, the own elasticity
is  small in  the first  quartile  (0.10  (TSLS)), but increases  dramatically  with the volume  of sales
(0.49  for fourth quartile(TSLS)).  Note  that the elasticity estimates  in case of fruits for different
quartiles obtained  from the Tobit are consistently  much higher than the TSLS estimates.
33It is  interesting to note that, according  to the Tobit  estimates for  rice, the own externality effect  is very high
(0.89)  in first quartile but dies down very fast at higher levels of trade;  the elasticity for the last quartile being only
0.29.
19The  elasticity  estimates  for  cross  externality  effects  show  a  monotonically  declining  (alge-
braically) trend in case of fruits with a positive effect  for the first one or two quartiles, depending
on the estimator  used.  The  elasticity  estimates for the last  two quartiles  are,  however,  signifi-
cantly negative,  irrespective  of the estimation  method  employed.  Except for the second  quartile
where elasticity estimates are rather small  (-0.02 (TSLS) and 0.05 (Tobit)), the effects are large in
magnitude  for all other quartiles.  For example, concentrating on the TSLS estimates,  a doubling
of per capita sales of all other commodities by all other households  in the village tend to increase
the total sales  of fruits  by a typical  household  by  11  percent  if the village  level  surplus  is  low
enough  to be in the  first  quartile.  In contrast,  the total  sales  of fruits  of a typical  household
decreases by (i) 28 percent if it belongs to a village in the third quartile,  and (ii) 49 percent if the
sales volume in the  village is high enough to be in the fourth quartile.  The elasticity  estimates
for the cross  externality  effects for other  two crop groups,  i.e.,  rice and vegetables  do not  follow
any monotonic pattern.  For rice, consistent  with the flat shape of the nonparametric  curve, the
magnitudes  of the elasticity  are very  small  across  second  and third quartiles  and is  large  only
for first quartile.  The  important thing to note in the elasticity  estimates  for  vegetables  is that
the cross externality  is negative for the first and fourth quartiles.  In contrast,  for the second and
third quartiles,  the estimates are positive  and numerically  significant,  especially  according to the
Tobit estimates,  providing strong evidence of pooling of other commodities to achieve  economies
of scale  in this range of overall  commodity trade.
Are the Results  due to unobserved  heterogeneity?
In the above,  we presented evidence  of strong own externality effects for all three crop groups:
rice, vegetables,  and fruits.  The vegetables  exhibit  the strongest  cross  externality effects,  espe-
cially at medium  volumes of trade, among three  crop groups  and there are weak  evidence  of its
operation,  only at low volume of trade, for fruits.  The evidence on rice suggest  a virtual absence
of cross externality effects.34 A more skeptical  among  us might still have reservations  about the
results on the ground that we did not have adequate  controls for heterogeneity  at household  (like
soil  quality) or village  (weather  shocks,  pest  attacks)  levels  in our data set.  A  strong counter-
argument is that any heterogeneity  in production,  both at household and village levels,  should be
34Recall that the overall cross  externality effects  are insignificant  for rice  according to the TSLS estimates.
20adequately  controlled  for by the per acre  yield  variable.  In this section,  we provide  additional
evidence  to support the conclusion that the correlations  between  individual sales and the village
level  sales  are,  in general,  not  driven by unobserved heterogeneity  in the production  side.  We
concentrate on the sub-sample of households who produce a commodity but do not sell anything in
the market.  If the increasing returns in marketing  due to fixed costs  and thick market effects are
the real driving  forces behind the correlations  between a given household's sales and the average
sales  of its neighbors,  then such correlations  will be absent  for the sub-sample  of households who
do not sell anything  in the market.  Observe that the preceding argument  encounters a difficulty
because  the sales  of a household  is  zero,  by definition,  if it does not  participate  in the market,
and we can not estimate a sales equation to test the validity of the argument.  However, a related
argument  can still be made  focusing on the production  of such self-sufficient  households.  Con-
sider  the case where  some  unobserved household  level production  characteristics  rather than the
economies  of scale  in marketing  are the driving  force  behind  the observed  correlations  between
the  sales  of an  individual  farmer  and that  of the  neighbors  in  a village.  Such  correlations  in
the production  side  implies  that the  production  of even  a self-sufficient  farm household  will  be
correlated  with the production  of, and  hence with the sales of, its neighbors  in the village.  So
the production  of the non-participants  in the market can be used  as a dependent variable  to test
the hypothesis that the correlations  are not due to increasing returns to marketing,  rather due to
some omitted  correlated  production characteristics  or shocks.  The results are reported in Table
4 where the dependent  variable  for both the sub-sample and  the full sample  is the logarithm  of
production and the estimation is done using OLS with standard errors corrected for the clustering
effects.
The results,  in general,  support  the conclusion that the  correlations  between the sales of an
individual household  and the average  sales of its neighbors  are not driven  by unobserved hetero-
geneity.  The  evidence  is  very  strong  in case of own externality  effects  for rice and  vegetables
where  the coefficients  of the own externality  variables  are both numerically  and statistically  in-
significant  for  the  sub-sample  of non-market  producers,  but  are markedly  larger  in magnitude
and statistically highly  significant  for the  full sample.  For fruits,  however,  the evidence  indicate
that unobserved  production heterogeneity  might be important (the coefficient  in the sub-sample
of non-market  producers  is numerically  and statistically significant).  But observe that the mag-
21nitude of the coefficient  in the full sample  (0.09)  is 50 percent higher than the estimate from the
sub-sample  (0.06).  So it is unlikely that the own externality effect  in case of fruits is exclusively
due to unobserved  heterogeneity.
The  evidence  on  cross  externality  effects  show  that,  in  case  of rice,  there  is  no  significant
difference  between  the  coefficient  estimates  from  the  full-  and  sub-sample,  thus  confirming  our
earlier result  that cross  externality  effects  are  virtually absent  from  rice sales.  For vegetables,
on the other  hand,  the evidence  clearly  indicate  that the cross-externality  effect  is not driven  by
unobserved production heterogeneity  (the coefficients  are:  for sub-sample  -0.003  (t =-0.12) and
for  full  sample  -0.04  (t =  -1.57)).  Similar  results  are obtained  for  cross-externality  effect  in
case  of fruits, where  the coefficient  for the full sample -0.06  (t =  -1.73)  is  much larger than the
corresponding  coefficient  for the  sub-sample of non-market producers  -0.01  (t =  -0.35).
The above  discussion  leads  us to conclude  that,  except  for the case  of own externality  effect
for fruits, our results  are not likely to be due to unobserved  heterogeneity.
Conclusions:
Using  a simple  model  of a  marketing  intermediary  in  the presence  of increasing  returns  to
marketing  due to  thick  market  effects and fixed  costs,  we  provide  evidence  on  pecuniary  exter-
nalities at the producer  level  sales decision  in the rural markets  of Bangladesh.  The evidence,
first  of its kind, show that there are strong own externalities stemming from the expansion of the
scale of trading  of a commodity  itself, and  also cross  externalities  from trading  of different  com-
modities.  The evidence  on the rice  market show that there is strong own externality  effects,  but
no significant  cross externality  effect,  implying that rice  marketing is specialized  and the market
has attained a level  of maturity.  There  are evidence  of a negative  own externality  like effect  in
the  vegetables  markets in  villages with low or moderate  marketable  surplus.  These  vegetables
markets might be caught in an underdevelopment  trap in that they are not served by long-range
marketing intermediaries,  and  hence the markets are essentially small and isolated local markets.
At medium volume of trade,  there is also strong cross externality effects in the case of vegetables.
The  significant  cross  externality  effects  suggest  that the intermediaries  dealing with vegetables,
particularly  in moderately developed  vegetables markets,  still need to pool other commodities  to
reap the  increasing  returns  to marketing.  Although  the evidence  in case  of fruits indicate  that
22they  are serviced  by formal marketing  intermediaries,  the  level of development  of these markets
is also  low.  It seems that  vegetables  and  to some  extent,  fruits markets  are  characterized  by a
lack of specialization  in marketing.
The results reported  in this paper have  important implications  for the design and placement
of poverty  alleviation  projects  and  for policies  to  accelerate  the  development  of rural  markets.
An important  implication  of the findings  reported  in  this paper  is that an  otherwise  identical
farm  household  is  expected  to get,  on  an  average,  lower  prices  for  its produce  if located  in  a
relatively  low  income,  low  surplus,  and  hence  less  commercialized  region  . This  might  result
in geographic  pockets  of subsistence  dominated  economy  with  high  incidence  of poverty.  The
extent of development  of markets  in  a particular  geographic  region,  from  this perspective,  is  a
local public  good  for  individual  households  located  in that  very  region.35 Another  important
implication  of the results reported  here  is that  market  deregulation  and liberalization  may not
always  generate  spontaneous  and  cumulative  forces  of market  development.  For  example,  our
analysis and evidence indicate that certain markets might be trapped in a low level of development
due to factors  like  low marketable  surplus,  and  a lack of storage and transportation facilities,  as
they constrain the ability of a marketing  intermediary to reap the economies of scale  and  might
create  a coordination  failure  at the  farm  level  sales  decisions.  More  importantly,  one  would,
in  general,  observe  uneven development  of rural  markets  for  different  commodities  and  across
different  geographic  locations  even if the  same generic  policies of deregulation  and  liberalization
are implemented  across the country.  Although necessary,  deregulation  and liberalization  may not
be sufficient  for development  of rural markets.  The recent evidence on the rural markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa show that the policies of deregulation  and  liberalization  implemented during the
1980s have improved the efficiency  of marketing, but have largely  failed to generate a spontaneous
and sustained dynamics of market development  ( see, for example,  Kherallah et al.  (2000),  Jerome
and Ogunkola  (2000)).  Although  development  of a market  is best  viewed as a highly  complex
path dependent evolutionary process, the results of this paper indicate that the increasing returns
to marketing and the resulting externalities at the farm level might be important in shaping that
process in the  rural areas of developing countries.
35While  free mobility of labor can, in principle, mitigate the effects of geographic poverty traps, the underdevel-
opment traps in our case can persist due to the area specificity of agricultural  land.
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25Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Unit  Median  Mean  Standard  No. of
Deviation  Observations
Rice  Sales  taka  575  5443  12190  3157
As % of production  %  9  20  24  3157
Vegetables  Sales  taka  0  929  4352  2803
As % of production  %  0  22  30  2803
Fruits  Sales  taka  0  908  4506  2635
As %ofproduction  %  0  26  31  2635
Total  Sales  taka  1500  7579  16008  4026
As % of production  %  27  30  27  4026
Village Level
Rice  Sales  taka  42265  69011  76331  249
As % of production  %  29  29  18  249
Vegetables  Sales  taka  1890  10457  38194  249
As % of production  %  32  34  26  249
Fruits  Sales  taka  2000  9609  25943  249
As % of production  %  27  32  25  249
Total  Sales  taka  88398  122537  120657  249
As % of production  %  40  39  17  249
26Table 2:Non-Parametric Instrumental  Variable Estimation of Household's Sales Decision
Dependent variable=log(quantity sold)  Rice  Vegetables  Fruits
Tobit  TSLS  Tobit  TSLS  Tobit  TSLS
R  t  R  t  B  t  B  t  B  t  B  t
Village level  Median expenditure  -0.66  -4.96  -0.43  -3.16  -0.01  -0.07  0.01  0.09  0.23  1.30  0.15  1.18
variables  Travel time to nearest mkt  -4.E-03  -0.49  6.E-04  0.09  0.01  1.75  0.01  1.09  -0.01  -1.49  -0.01  -0.99
Population  3.E-05  0.82  5.E-05  1.37  -5.E-05  -1.72  -6.E-06  -0.25  1.E-05  0.29  5.E-06  0.15
Agricultural Wage Rate  -0.53  -1.93  -0.31  -1.30  -0.50  -1.91  -0.20  -0.82  -0.58  -1.67  -0.31  -0.86
Dummy for  Bank in the village  -0.64  -0.94  -0.31  -0.49  -1.31  -1.83  -0.62  -1.34  -0.66  -0.78  -0.41  -0.57
Market in the village  -0.24  -0.75  -0.25  -0.78  0.94  2.95  0.37  1.57  0.98  2.52  0.58  1.71
Telephone in the village  0.26  0.65  0.06  0.18  0.67  1.65  0.20  0.55  1.03  2.07  0.60  1.42
Electricity in the village  -0.35  -1.98  -0.11  -0.71  -0.29  -1.79  -0.07  -0.53  -0.03  -0.12  0.09  0.50
Paved  road in  the village  0.33  1.91  0.19  1.17  -0.54  -2.99  -0.17  -1.14  -0.28  -1.23  -0.17  -0.95
% of land irrigated  4.E-03  1.44  1.E-03  0.55  0.01  2.16  3.E-03  1.17  -0.01  -2.08  -4.E-03  -1.24
Household  Household size  -3.07  -11.61  -1.57  -9.88  -1.93  -7.44  -0.93  -7.57  -2.04  -6.32  -1.13  -6.22
Variables  share of adult male  -0.61  -0.97  -0.23  -0.58  -0.68  -1.11  -0.18  -0.56  -1.16  -1.57  -0.57  -1.20
share of adult female  -0.94  -1.43  -0.43  -1.10  -0.23  -0.38  -0.11  -0.42  -1.19  -1.56  -0.61  -1.44
share of children  2.50  5.09  1.08  3.92  1.00  2.12  0.32  1.28  -0.12  -0.19  0.03  0.09
Av.  yr of male education  -0.33  -1.80  -0.18  -1.65  -0.52  -2.81  -0.23  -2.40  -0.24  -1.06  -0.14  -1.11
Av.  yr of female education  -0.16  -0.72  -0.02  -0.14  -0.54  -2.38  -0.16  -1.69  -0.49  -1.79  -0.18  -1.18
Yield per acre  3.45  29.44  1.92  25.99  2.38  29.75  1.27  25.28  1.45  16.57  0.90  17.83
Farm size  3.79  39.29  2.26  38.80  2.22  26.72  1.27  22.83  1.59  15.88  1.07  16.70
Fertilizer use per acre  -0.01  -0.96  -2.E-03  -2.59  -0.09  -1.76  -0.02  -0.66  0.03  0.58  0.03  1.15
Share in total production  -0.34  -0.92  -0.10  -0.42  0.21  0.64  -0.24  -1.29  -0.93  -2.01  -1.01  -3.98
Constant term  -10.94  -6.70  -4.34  -3.54  -1.48  -0.99  -0.04  -0.03  -0.06  -0.03  0.75  0.43
R2/Pseudo R 2 0.18  0.47  0.18  0.56  0.11  0.43
No. of Observations  2852  2852  2505  2505  1943  1943
Tests of joint significance of  F P-value  F P-value  F P-value  F P-value  F P-value  F P-value
Own Extemality effect  2.09  0.004  1.71  0.04  5.54  0.00  3.14  0.00  3.14  0.00  4.07  0.00
Cross Commodity Extemality effect  209  0.004  1.10  0.35  2.81  0.00  1.49  0.09  1.82  0.02  1.31  0.18
All regressions included a set of regional dummies also (omitted for brevity)
Note: Standard errors for TSLS are corrected for within cluster correlations in residuals due to survey design.
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2~~~~~~~~~2Table 3:  Estimates of elasticities at different quartile of the cross and own externality  variables
Rice  Vegetables  Fruits
TSLS  Tobit  TSLS  Tobit  TSLS  Tobit
Own Externality
Quartile  1  0.47  0.89  -0.26  -0.49  0.10  0.29
2  0.38  0.49  -0.18  -0.35  0.12  0.21
3  0.38  0.32  0.10  -0.04  0.38  0.44
4  0.38  0.29  0.27  -0.01  0.49  0.51
Average  0.41  0.50  -0.02  -0.22  0.27  0.36
Cross Commodity Externality
Quartile  1  0.23  0.34  -0.20  -0.23  0.11  0.26
2  0.00  0.08  0.04  0.14  -0.02  0.05
3  -0.01  0.04  0.11  0.30  -0.28  -0.43
4  0.08  0.17  -0.14  -0.11  -0.49  -0.94
Average  0.07  0.16  -0.048  0.02  -0.17  -0.27
30Table 4: Parametric  Estimation  of Household's Production  Decisions
Dependent variable  Rice  Vegetables  Fruits
=log(production)  Full sample  Sub-Sample'  Full sample  Sub-Sample'  Full sample  Sub-Sample'
B  t  B  t  B  t  v  t  v  t  B  t
Village level Variables
Own extemality  0.05  2.42  -0.01  -0.44  0.10  6.44  0.002  0.10  0.09  5.02  0.06  2.91
Cross commodity  externality  -0.03  -1.35  -0.04  -1.48  -0.04  -1.78  -0.003  -0.12  -0.06  -1.73  -0.01  -0.35
Median  expenditure  0.13  3.49  0.17  3.92  0.06  1.61  -0.007  -0.17  0.10  2.12  0.06  1.14
Travel time to  nearest mkt  0.00  1.84  0.002  1.41  0.00  2.33  4E-03  2.44  0.00  1.78  3E-03  1.05
Population  0.00  -2.27  -2E-05  -2.12  0.00  -0.45  2E-07  0.27  0.00  -0.49  -4E-07  -0.21
Agricultural Wage  Rate  0.05  0.64  0.25  2.23  -0.06  -0.57  0.07  0.58  -0.06  -0.72  -0.04  -0.32
Dummy for
Bank in  the village  0.13  0.67  0.12  0.56  0.12  0.57  0.19  0.80  0.34  1.22  0.16  0.39
Market  in the village  -0.19  -2.01  -0.03  -0.26  -0.27  -2.45  -0.32  -2.54  -0.41  -2.84  -0.38  -2.76
Telephone in the village  0.08  0.88  -0.02  -0.14  0.17  1.73  0.09  0.96  0.22  1.69  0.02  0.14
Electricity in the village  -0.01  -0.13  -0.17  -2.73  -0.01  -0.22  -0.03  -0.53  -0.08  -1.28  -0.16  -2.21
Paved road in the village  -0.09  -1.70  -0.12  -1.9  -0.04  -0.69  0.09  -1.43  -0.06  -1.09  -0.03  -0.45
% of land irrigated  0.00  -3.66  -0.002  -1.94  0.00  -4.21  -0.004  -3.35  0.00  -4.65  -0.005  -4.9
Household Variables
Household size  0.73  13.49  0.76  10.02  0.64  9.85  0.65  7.57  0.63  9.45  0.57  6.09
share of adult male  0.14  2.81  0.07  0.94  0.03  0.46  -0.01  -0.13  0.11  1.54  0.09  0.85
share of adult female  0.11  1.87  0.14  1.61  0.24  3.70  0.28  3.42  0.18  2.31  0.26  2.49
share of children  -0.20  -7.08  -1.68  -4.36  -0.21  -5.94  -0.20  -4.20  -0.19  -4.85  -0.22  -4.16
Av.  yrofmaleeducation  0.16  4.69  0.19  3.32  0.21  4.98  0.24  4.81  0.15  3.77  0.30  4.64
Av.  yr of female education  0.16  3.30  0.12  1.57  0.02  0.37  -0.06  -0.98  0.17  2.99  0.08  1.01
Yield per acre  0.47  18.49  0.42  14.3  0.67  34.47  0.58  23.07  0.71  32.32  0.74  29.89
Hired labor (hours)  0.42  14.97  0.42  9.57  0.29  9.86  0.27  8.38  0.33  10.57  0.31  7.47
Seed Expenditure  0.23  12.90  0.22  11.3  0.28  15,16  0.23  12.29  0.28  15.40  0.27  11.94
Share in total production  -0.66  -8.45  -0.51  -5.28  0.11  0.81  0.29  1.66  -0.49  -3.18  0.09  0.49
Constant term  2.11  4.51  1.2  2.17  1.69  3.21  1.45  2.07  2.30  4.05  1.65  2.25
R2/Pseudo R 2 0.70  0.61  0.76  0.65  0.80  0.78
No. of Observations  2763  1200  2239  1171  1719  776
Note: 1/: Sub-sample includes only those households which produce but do  not sell the commodity.
All  regressions are estimated  using OLS. Standard  errors are corrected for clustering effects.
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